Acta Oeconomica Pragensia 2011, 19(6):65-79 | DOI: 10.18267/j.aop.352

Is Bribery a Good Way to Improve Efficiency in Law Enforcement?

Tomáš Otáhal
Mendelova univerzita v Brně, Provozně ekonomická fakulta (tomas.otahal@mendelu.cz).

The economic theory of the last decades deals with how certain models of institutions and incentives could improve the coordination of individual actions in society. Setting rules regulating relationships between economic agents is considered as the key requirement of such coordination. Nevertheless, the rule has no impact if it is not enforced. Gary Becker and George Stigler suggest a solution that could significantly contribute to efficiency in law enforcement. Gordon Tullock does not agree with their idea. The aim of the paper is to analyze their arguments and to answer the question: "Is Becker's and Stigler's recommendation a good way to efficiency in law enforcement?" The discussion presented in this paper suggests that Gary Becker's and George Stigler's proposal might improve efficiency in law enforcement if certain institutional conditions are assumed. Nevertheless, Gordon Tullock assumes different institutional conditions; therefore, he rejects Gary Becker's and George Stigler's proposal.

Keywords: corruption, rent-seeking, rule of law
JEL classification: D72, D73, L26

Published: October 1, 2011  Show citation

ACS AIP APA ASA Harvard Chicago Chicago Notes IEEE ISO690 MLA NLM Turabian Vancouver
Otáhal, T. (2011). Is Bribery a Good Way to Improve Efficiency in Law Enforcement? Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, 19(6), 65-79. doi: 10.18267/j.aop.352
Download citation
  • BibTeX (.bib)
  • Bookends (.ris)
  • EasyBib (.ris)
  • EndNote (.enw)
  • EndNote 8 (.xml)
  • ISI WoS (.isi)
  • Medlars (.medlars)
  • Mendeley (.ris)
  • MODS (.xml)
  • Papers (.ris)
  • RefWorks (.txt)
  • RefManager (.ris)
  • RIS (.ris)
  • MS Word (.xml)
  • Zotero (.ris)
    • Open full article

    References

    1. BANFIELD, E. C. 1975. Corruption as the Feature of Governmental Organization. Journal of Law and Economics. 1975, vol. 18, no. 3, s. 587-605. Go to original source...
    2. BECKER, G. S.; STIGLER, G. J. 1974. Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies. 1974, vol. 3, no. 1, s. 1-18. Go to original source...
    3. BENSON, B. L. 1981. A Note on Corruption by Public Officials: The Black Market for Property Rights. Journal of Libertarian Studies. 1981, vol. 5, no. 3, s. 305-311.
    4. COASE, R. H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica. 1937, vol. 4, no. 16, s. 386-405. Go to original source...
    5. COASE, R. H. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics. 1960, vol. 3, no. 1, s. 1-44. Go to original source...
    6. DEMSETZ, H. 1968a. Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint. Journal of Law and Economics. 1968, vol. 12, no. 1, s. 1-22. Go to original source...
    7. DEMSETZ, H. 1968b. Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of Law and Economics. 1968, vol. 11, no. 1, s. 55-65. Go to original source...
    8. FRIEDMAN, D. 1979. Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case. Journal of Legal Studies. 1979, vol. 8, no. 2, s. 399-415. Go to original source...
    9. HAY R. J.; SHLEIFER, A. 1998. Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform. American Economic Review. 1998, vol. 88, no. 2, s. 398-403.
    10. HAYEK, F A. v. 1995. Kontrarevoluce vědy. Praha : Liberální institut, 1995.
    11. HAYEK, F A. v. 2001. Zásady liberálního společenského řádu. In Zásady liberálního řádu. Praha : Academia, 2001.
    12. KIRZNER, I. M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. London (UK); Chicago (IL) : The University of Chicago Press, 1973.
    13. KIRZNER, I. M. 1985. Discovery and Capitalist Process. London (UK); Chicago (IL) : The University of Chicago Press, 1985.
    14. KRUEGER, A. O. 1974. The Political Economy of Rent-seeking Society. American Economic Review. 1974, vol. 64, no. 3, s. 291-303.
    15. LANDES, M. W.; POSNER, R. A. 1974. The Private Enforcement of Law. Journal of Legal Studies. 1974, vol. 4, no. 1, s. 1-46. Go to original source...
    16. MISES, L. v. 2002. Byrokracie. Praha : Liberální institut, 2002.
    17. MISES, L. v. 1990. Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth: a Treatise on Economics. Auburn (AL) : Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1990.
    18. MISES, L. v. 1996. Human Action. San Francisco, CA : Foundation for Economic Education, 1996.
    19. MOLINARI, G. D. 1977. The Production of Security. Auburn (AL) : Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1977.
    20. NISKANEN, W. A. 1968. The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy. American Economic Review. 1968, vol. 58, no. 3, s. 293-305.
    21. NORTH, D. C. 2002. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2002.
    22. NORTH, D. C.; WALLIS, J. J.; WEINGAST, B. R. 2009. Violence and Social Order: A conceptual framework for interpretation recorded human history. Cambridge; New York; Melbourne; Madrid; Cape Town; Singapore; Sáo Paulo : Cambridge University Press, 2009. Go to original source...
    23. NOZICK, R. 1974. Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York (NY) : Basil Books, 1974.
    24. OTÁHAL, T. 2008a. Na obranu dobývání renty. Ekonomický časopis/Journal of Economics. 2008, roč. 56, č. 10, s. 1019-1032.
    25. OTÁHAL, T 2008b. Teorie podnikatelského objevování. Politická ekonomie. 2008, roč. 56, č. 5, s. 669683. Go to original source...
    26. OTÁHAL, T 2009. Problém zastoupení v nové institucionální ekonomii. Politická ekonomie. 2009, roč. 57, č. 5, s. 677-695. Go to original source...
    27. OTÁHAL, T 2011. When Great Economists Know a Lot About History. Prague Economic Papers. 2011, vol. 20, no. 1, s. 89-93. Go to original source...
    28. PADILLA, A. 2002. Property Economics of Agency Problems. Auburn (AL) : Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2002.
    29. ROTHBARD, M. N. 2004a. Man, Economyy, and State. Auburn (AL) : Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2004.
    30. ROTHBARD, M. N. 2004b. Power and Market. Auburn (AL) : Ludwig von Mises Institue, 2004. Chapter 1.
    31. ROTHBARD, M. N. 1956. Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics. Auburn (AL) : Ludwig von Mises Institue, 1956.
    32. SMITH, A. 2001. Pojednání o podstatě a původu bohatství národů. Praha : Liberální institut, 2001.
    33. ŠIMA, J. 1999. Právo a obrana jako zboží na trhu. Praha : Megaprint, 1999.
    34. TULLOCK, G. 1987. Rent seeking. The New Palgrave a Dictionary of Economics. 1998. Book 4, s. 147-149. Go to original source...
    35. TULLOCK, G. 1996. Corruption Theory and Practice. Contemporary Economic Policy. 1996, vol. 14, no. 3, s. 9-20. Go to original source...
    36. VARIAN, H. R. 2003. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach. New York (NY); London (UK) : W. W. Norton & Company, 2003.

    This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is properly cited. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.


    Return to the content