D72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting BehaviorReturn
Results 1 to 2 of 2:
Reflection of the Election Cycle in Public Procurement in PraguePetra DrzkováActa Oeconomica Pragensia 2013, 21(4):49-68 | DOI: 10.18267/j.aop.410 The aim of this paper is to reveal whether there is a relation between public procurement and the election cycle in Prague. The examined data cover the period from 2005 to 2011. Two hypotheses have been set in order to discover whether there is such a relation. The first one postulates that public procurement is used for construction, wellvisible investment, so as to increase the probability of being re-elected. The second hypothesis marks the effort of politicians to maximise their own benefits until the end of their electoral term as the main reason for contracting public procurement. The hypotheses are proven with the number of public procurement projects, the total amount of money spent on public procurement in a particular term, the average amount of bids and the relation between the final and expected price. Regression analysis was used as the tool for verification. The result is that it is possible to find such a relation dependence of supplies and services and the election cycle in Prague. |
Is Bribery a Good Way to Improve Efficiency in Law Enforcement?Tomáš OtáhalActa Oeconomica Pragensia 2011, 19(6):65-79 | DOI: 10.18267/j.aop.352 The economic theory of the last decades deals with how certain models of institutions and incentives could improve the coordination of individual actions in society. Setting rules regulating relationships between economic agents is considered as the key requirement of such coordination. Nevertheless, the rule has no impact if it is not enforced. Gary Becker and George Stigler suggest a solution that could significantly contribute to efficiency in law enforcement. Gordon Tullock does not agree with their idea. The aim of the paper is to analyze their arguments and to answer the question: "Is Becker's and Stigler's recommendation a good way to efficiency in law enforcement?" The discussion presented in this paper suggests that Gary Becker's and George Stigler's proposal might improve efficiency in law enforcement if certain institutional conditions are assumed. Nevertheless, Gordon Tullock assumes different institutional conditions; therefore, he rejects Gary Becker's and George Stigler's proposal. |
