K40 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: GeneralReturn

The independence of central banks is a hot topic. In connection with the ongoing financial crisis, the media often come with concerns that central banks might be influenced by political elites. These considerations apply both to central banks of EU Member States and the European Central Bank. The aim of this paper is to prove or disprove the hypothesis of limited independence of the ECB. The main reason to focus primarily on the ECB is due to its leadership within the European System of Central Banks as well as due to the fact that any interference in its activities would affect mainly the functioning of the ESCB. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the theory of central banks' independence in general. The second part presents the issue of status and regulation of the ECB, and the last part applies the knowledge of the theory of independence of central banks to an evaluation of the independence of the ECB.

The text deals with claimants approaching to insolvency proceedings in decisions by courts. It focuses on the application of the Civil Proceedings Act to insolvency proceedings, especially problems of approaching insolvency proceedings. It also reflects the incorrect application of law in the decision of insolvency courts and explains how to apply the Civil Proceedings Act and Insolvency Act properly.