G28 - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationReturn

This paper deals with the experience of third pillar reform in the Czech Republic, executed in 2013. The core of our study is formed by a comparative analysis of newly introduced supplementary pension savings and its substitute products (investment funds, life insurance) from two main aspects: product features and distribution features. The outcomes are supported by empirical sales and population penetration of the surveyed products. The results indicate that even a pension product with a very attractive product design, such as supplementary pension savings, will be hampered by its substitutes as long as its distribution features are unattractive. This is an important lesson, particularly for the discussed European solution, the pan-European portable pension product (PEPP).

The aim of this paper is to analyse the potential design and competences of a European Deposit Insurance System, which would extend the operation of the existing Single Resolution Mechanism. The analysis also builds on the design of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) operating in the US, which is endowed with both resolution and deposit insurance competences. I argue that the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) could be transformed into a Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Fund (SRDIF) whose capacity would be increased to 1.8% of insured deposits. SRDIF resources would be available both for bank resolution and deposit pay-outs. The main elements of the financing arrangements for the SRDIF would include risk-weighted ex-ante contributions from the banking sector and a public backstop created through a transformed ESM. Given the legal constraints derived from the so-called Meroni ruling, the discretionary decision making of an institution managing the SRDIF would have to involve the Commission and the Council as is the case of the existing Single Resolution Board (SRB). In order to mitigate the adverse selection issue, mutualisation of resources in the SRDIF would have to be gradual over a transition period of six years until 2024. A sufficient reduction of risks across national banking sectors in the EU/Eurozone Member States would have to be achieved in the transition period.

The latest financial crisis, among other consequences, has led to significant reductions in bank lending. Because cashless bank loans granted to non-bank clients are the dominant way of issue of money into the economy, reducing of them influenced also deflationary pressures. Central banks have tried to respond by expansionary monetary policy in the form of purchases of debt securities from banks and interest rate cuts. However, without any significant effect. Banks did not use a higher quantity of money in the banking system to order to increase granting of loans into the economy. We could observe the similar problems in the Czech Republic. Analysis of data between late 2008 - mid-2014 reliably confirms the weak impact of the Czech National Bank on the development of credit and the quantity of money in the economy. We analyzed data on currency, bank reserves, the monetary base, the monetary aggregates, deposits and loans. Separate analysis concerned the money multipliers and the credit multiplier. The banking system in the Czech Republic is also very specific in the existence of large excess bank reserves. The policy of lowering interest rates by the central bank had not the desired effect, so the only possibility was depreciation of the domestic currency. Another enormous increase in bank reserves as a direct result of unsterilized foreign exchange intervention again did not lead to a significant growth in loans and the quantity of money in the economy. Pressures against deflation can therefore be expected only from the reaction of households and firms to weaker domestic currency.

Financial innovations should be regarded as a substantial element in the functioning of modern economies and financial sectors. However, their general impact is to be assessed from the present perspective, essentially depending on their particular behaviour and the role they play in the economy. Most importantly, this text follows both the Post-Keynesian and the Regulation School logic, trying to clarify business cycle volatility with respect to the intensity of innovative activities in the financial sector. The article also discusses some hypothetical causal relationships between the 2007-2008 financial and economic crisis and financial innovation activities, largely accelerated in intensity over the preceding two decades. As it is clearly demonstrated, the "Great Moderation" argument has not been entirely confirmed and a number of mainstream economists have ultimately been forced to adjust their respective approaches towards the functioning of modern economies.

The authors of the article point out that economic theory has failed to yield a solid theoretical background in critical situations such as the current financial and economic crisis and the transformation of post-communist economies. Mainly the present crisis opens the question of the unsatisfactory status of economic science. While classical liberal or Keynesian concepts are failing, theorists cannot look to mathematical modelling for help. It seems that traditional concepts malfunction, and the financial market is particularly predisposed for this process. The application of mathematical models is overvalued. The article calls attention to the possible influence and adequacy of regulatory attitudes on a return to equilibrium. It seems that the part of ethics must be upgraded decidedly. The challenge for today's theoretical economists is to find a new paradigm of economic science for today's global era.

The article provides a basic description and taxonomy of sovereign wealth funds, rapidly gaining importance in the international monetary and financial systems. SFWs are pools of assets owned and managed directly or indirectly by governments to achieve specific objectives. Tentative estimates of foreign assets held by SWFs are between USD 1.9 trillion and USD 2.9 trillion. These amounts are about 10 times less than the assets under management of mature market institutional investors and modestly higher than those managed by hedge funds. Current IMF projections are that sovereign wealth funds will accumulate international assets under sovereign management up to about USD 12 trillion by 2012, but growth estimates are different. The author's estimate of the SWFs' growth by 2013 is between USD 3.9-5.4 trillion. These funds have raised concerns about financial stability, corporate governance and political interference and protectionism. The following analysis does not prove the negative distortions of these funds on global financial stability and capital flows. In response to these concerns, the IMF with SWFs have made public voluntary Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) for SWF, and the OECD has published guidance on recepient country policies towards the SWFs. Recipient countries should strive to avoid protectionism and should uphold fair and transparent investment frameworks.