Acta Oeconomica Pragensia 2009, 17(5):70-88 | DOI: 10.18267/j.aop.284

The Importance of Direct Democracy Tools for the Quality of Political Competition at the National and Local Levels

Petr Chmelík
Masarykova univerzita v Brně, Ekonomicko-správní fakulta (chmelik.petr@email.cz).

Quality of political competition is the essential answer to the question of how people's wishes can be represented and coordinated in the public sphere in the most effective way. The paper defines the forms of political competition on political markets and shows referenda and initiatives as means to stabilize political business cycles and to break politicians' coalitions against the voters by destroying their monopoly on agenda setting and decision-making and by shrinking the informational advantage of the "classe politique" and well-organized interest groups. The mentioned positive effects on the quality of political competition can be demonstrated at both the national and local levels.

Keywords: Economic policy, direct democracy, Political-business cycle, Rent seeking behaviour
JEL classification: H

Published: August 1, 2009  Show citation

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Chmelík, P. (2009). The Importance of Direct Democracy Tools for the Quality of Political Competition at the National and Local Levels. Acta Oeconomica Pragensia17(5), 70-88. doi: 10.18267/j.aop.284
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